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Peace In Our Time ?

A Canadian Agenda into the 1990s

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BERNARD WOOD

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A Canadian Agenda into the 1990s

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THEMATIC SUMMARY

As a landmark year in modern history, 1989 will now surely rank with 1789, the year of the French Revolution. The anti-authoritarian revolution that swept Eastern Europe, together with the breaking down of Cold War confrontation, has opened up new hopes for peace and international cooperation. It has also opened up new international opportunities and responsibilities for Canadians.

It is deliberately provocative to ask whether this is the beginning of "peace in our time" – echoing the fateful tones of Neville Chamberlain's self-delusory appeasement. In the year that has marked the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War and the seventy-fifth anniversary of 1914, it is right to face that history squarely. We want to believe that this "peace" is real and enduring, yet millennia of human experience and recent decades of history counsel caution.

Our gaze is riveted on the drama of Eastern Europe, but we are still aware of wars and threats elsewhere, as well as the brutal setback of reform for one-quarter of humanity in Tienanmen Square. If millions of people are beginning to dare to hope that the recourse to armed conflict among major nations will decline, their hope is tied to the concern that humanity as a whole now faces new security threats, particularly to the Earth's environment and life-support systems. Trade frictions among Western partners could become trading wars among protectionist regional blocs, sapping the ability of these nations to respond to global problems. The improved East-West relationship should allow for greater attention to the festering problems of the Third World, but paradoxically it could lead to even greater neglect.

What Can Canada Do About All This?

This period is much like that of the great re-ordering of the international system which followed the second world war. That era ushered in a "golden age" of Canadian diplomacy and peacekeeping with which this nation made its welcome mark throughout the world, and greatly strengthened its own sense of common purpose in the process.

If the changed international climate now permits much more effective influence for Canada, it will also demand changes in the way we see and conduct ourselves in the world. When we have been left on the sidelines of the international action, too many Canadians, including some who should know better, have come to expect our foreign policy to be a kind of pious running commentary on the conduct of others. It was this tendency of Canadians to see themselves as the self-appointed conscience of the world that led Dean Acheson to dub us, in Wordsworth's phrase, "the stern daughter of the voice of God." Regrettably, when our own interests are involved, we have shown, that we have no corner on international morality or virtue, although in relative terms we remain solid citizens.

In a new era of Canadian relevance in the world, we will have to pursue our interests and uphold our values straightforwardly, recognizing that others will do the same and that they have their own consciences which they will heed about as frequently as we do our own.

Many Canadians will be diffident about a renewed peace-building mission, because self-skepticism is an even more popular Canadian game than *Trivial Pursuit*, but there are few foreigners who would question this country's unique credentials for international order-building in the current world situation. Surely in an era when the Berlin wall and Nicolae Ceausescu can fall, even Canadian skeptics should be susceptible to inspiration.

Dismantling the Cold War

Ottawa was one of the slowest of the Western capitals to accept the reality and significance of Mr. Gorbachev's revolution, but by mid-year it had done so and by year-end the Prime Minister and a large private sector delegation had made a successful and productive visit to the Soviet Union.

Canada has a direct role in the negotiations to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe – with temporarily increased importance as "the other North-America" NATO partner in this time of change. Our leading role in verification work has also borne fruit, and the "Open Skies" conference in Ottawa in February will be the first major focus of East-West consultation in the wake of the last dramatic developments of the old year.

Economic cooperation and bridging assistance are now a vital part of the West's effort to maintain the momentum of reform in Eastern

Europe, although neither outside help nor the economic savings from military reductions will be large or fast enough to ease the brutally difficult transition for Eastern Europeans. In fact, the economic dislocation problem could now begin to be a drag on progress in arms reductions in both East and West. Even Canadians began to feel the pinch with the base closures last Spring, and in all countries, it will take political courage of a high order to weather the necessary adjustment to reap the incontestable long-term economic benefits.

With progress in East-West arms reduction, we must guard against the danger of the diversion of military production to new markets – this is the best time in decades for realistic efforts to combat the arms trafficking problem, and Canada is well placed to take a lead. Canadians also have a strong vested interest in extending arms control and reductions to the *qualitative* area, to promote balanced “capping” of the modernization of weapons that will create new security demands and instability. It is vital to get cruise missiles fully covered and controlled in East-West negotiations, in spite of the opposition of the US Navy.

Defence Policy Under Fire

However difficult and unpleasant the task, another basic re-thinking of Canadian defence policy is now inescapable. The 1989 Budget's reductions in planned spending ended any prospect that the capabilities would be provided to meet the commitments of the 1987 White Paper, and more cuts are widely expected. At the same time, the dramatic changes in the international environment now mean, as the Prime Minister has said, that the 1987 defence policy framework is outdated. The task of review will be even more difficult in the current climate, however, when threatening military capabilities will be reduced more slowly than political intentions, when new threats may be developing through weapons modernization, and when the various roles for the Canadian armed forces are in flux. Under these circumstances, an informed public debate of Canadian defence policy is going to be essential to a reasonable outcome, and will provide the best defence for Defence.

The arms control and conflict resolution components of Canadian security policy have obviously taken on added potential in recent years and months, but the defence component remains a large one. While Canadians think of our military spending as modest, it does rank 12th in the world (6th in NATO), even though the size of our armed forces ranks as 48th. Should Canada try to maintain a fully balanced force

structure, or "specialize" to a much greater extent? Depending on the outcome of the conventional force negotiations in Europe, should all or some of the Canadian contingent come home, and might European NATO members have spare capacity to lend us a hand with air and naval roles in the North American area? How can we best handle the need for aerospace surveillance, and the range of "non-military" security needs (against drugs, pollution, fisheries violations, etc) in our vast coastal zones? Finally, how should we handle the ever-growing demands on Canada in the peacekeeping area since they have now reached a scale where this can no longer simply be treated as an "ancillary" role for the Armed Forces?

Regional Conflicts and the United Nations

One of the strongest Canadian contributions to improving international security in this new decade, and this new era, should be expected in the reinforcement of the collective security operations of the United Nations – through its peace-making and peacekeeping functions. The Iran-Iraq truce, the Afghanistan withdrawal and the Namibia transition have all shown that the superpowers are now more ready to have this work carried out, and no country is better placed than Canada – with its unparalleled peacekeeping experience – to push forward the necessary measures to institutionalize these peacekeeping capacities.

Regional conflicts and the UN are not side-issues. Most of the 22 million human beings killed by warfare since World War Two have died in Third World conflicts where these international systems could now make a vital difference. If they are not now strengthened, together with the economic changes and assistance required to attack the root causes of much of this turmoil, we must expect more, bigger and more dangerous wars with an increase in the spillover into our own lives – in the forms of new weaponry, terrorism, refugee flows and environmental disasters. In addition to its peacekeeping record, and Security Council membership in 1990, Canada has brought high credibility to Third World issues because of its relatively generous aid programs. A reversal of this record through continued aid cutbacks would materially damage our capacity to contribute to global security.

Unless the new global opening is seized and fully developed, the 1990s are also likely to be a decade of proliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is up for renewal in 1995 and many believe that the maintenance of a non-proliferation regime will now hinge on a much more dramatic capping of the "vertical proliferation" by existing

nuclear weapons states. A full Test Ban may now be essential, and Canada's current step-by-step approach to this goal may no longer be sustainable. Chemical weapons – the "poor man's nuclear bomb" – and ballistic missile technologies are also serious proliferation problems, and they link back to both nuclear threats and conflict resolution, particularly in the Middle East.

Five Regions of Conflict

Movement in Israel itself is going to be key to progress in the Middle East conflict, now into its fifth dangerous decade. Shifting views in countries friendly to Israel, like Canada and particularly the United States, can make some difference, but Canada's capacity to help is severely impeded by the explosively polarized domestic debate.

In Central America, we still have hope for the peace plan for which Canada is one of the official observer nations, in spite of setbacks in Nicaragua and El Salvador and then the Panamanian intervention. In this first issue since Canada moved for full OAS membership, we confronted a murky and painful test, this time resolved in Washington's favour.

In Southern Africa, the efforts of Canada and others over recent years to assist the pressures for fundamental change, have borne some fruit and offer even greater hope. Progress in Namibia is so far inspiring, with beneficial spillovers into South Africa itself where there are the beginnings of real dialogue between a new President and statesmanlike black leaders. Progress in settling the horrific conflicts in Angola and Mozambique must still be strengthened.

In the Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, the vicious combination of warfare, famine and dislocation is now threatening to turn a new drought into a gigantic human tragedy, with the world standing by in helpless frustration. Perhaps it is time for the superpowers and the rest of the Security Council to step in and ensure that humanitarian aid can get through, by providing inspectors, observers and if necessary even escorts for these missions.

Finally, in late 1989, the UN majority, with Canada included, found itself in the odious position of having to reiterate support for the credentials of the opposition coalition, in which the Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot is the commanding partner. This abhorrent situation, originally dictated by the Vietnamese invasion and the dynamics of the Cold War,

should now be influenced by several new factors — not least the Vietnamese withdrawal — and Canada and other countries must do whatever they can, including urgent humanitarian aid activity, to help ensure that a negotiated cease fire and free elections do take place, and that there are viable alternative governments to the Khmer Rouge.

The rapidly evolving world situation as we enter the 1990s calls for a much more vigorous public debate of Canadian policy options. Following up the present statement, the Institute for Peace and Security will exercise this part of its mandate from Parliament more actively than in the past, beginning with a series of task forces on policy options early in 1990.

INTRODUCTION

The end of the 1980's and beginning of the 1990's may prove to be one of the greatest watersheds of modern history. "Experts," prognosticators and policy-makers are in rout and disarray as the verities of the post-war era are trampled under millions of quietly determined feet in the capitals of Central and Eastern Europe. Even some of the most hardened of cold warriors cannot resist the euphoria as promise turns to reality in widening circles of political, economic, diplomatic and military change. Some of the most jaded commentators are talking confidently of the end of the Cold War and a new era of peace and co-operation. Defence budgets are being cut, huge sums of Western aid are going to Eastern Europe, and the political will to achieve even deeper arms cuts may be running far ahead of the sheer capacity to negotiate the ones so far committed.

When the Canadian government's White Paper on Defence in 1987 said "Canadian security policy must respond to an international environment dominated by the rivalry between East and West" many Canadians strongly disagreed. But even those who found this a dated view at the time now feel a need to pinch themselves. Not only does the rapid thaw in the Cold War seem almost too good to be true, but the breakup has been so dramatic that the waters ahead are thick with random floes, and huge icebergs sometimes loom up in the path.

We want to believe that this "peace" is real and enduring, yet millennia of human experience and recent decades of history counsel caution. Our gaze is firmly rivetted on the drama of Eastern Europe, but we are still aware of wars and threats elsewhere. If millions of people are beginning to dare to hope that the recourse to armed conflict among major nations will decline, their hope is tied to the grave concern that humanity as a whole now faces ominous new security threats, particularly to the Earth's environment and life-support system.

It is deliberately provocative to ask whether this is the beginning of "peace in our time" – echoing the fateful tones of Neville Chamberlain's self-delusory appeasement. In the year that has marked the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War and the seventy-fifth anniversary of 1914, it is right and necessary to face that history squarely. The memory of Munich is still alive and has been the guide to much action for the intervening half-century. The guardians of

that bitter memory deserve their answer as to where there are, and are not, contemporary parallels.

We need to deepen our attention to the task of dismantling the monstrous underpinnings of the Cold War, and not just its facade. This concern, presumably, led the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists to hold its Doomsday Clock at six minutes to midnight as 1989 drew to a close, although many hard-headed experts would be prepared to ease off considerably farther at this stage. We also need to raise our sights and widen our gaze beyond the military and ideological conflict in Europe to a pressing new global agenda for peace and security. Fifty years from now, the great test of our generation in Europe and North America will not simply be whether we broke down the terrifying and ruinous nuclear confrontation that threatened life on earth, but whether we used this open historical moment with courage, creativity and vision to usher in a new *global* era of peace with justice.

This is not the “end of history” as one American commentator has claimed – humanity is surely entitled to hope that the best is yet to come.

The agenda is full and challenging, but this kind of challenge is what Canadians and many others have been awaiting for forty-five years. It will take every bit of Canada’s skill and idealism to steer our way through the turbulent waters ahead and help to shape the outcome. With the all-embracing East-West confrontation breaking down, moves to reduce reliance on military force, and the patterns of international leadership in flux, this is the equivalent of the great re-orderings of the international system which followed both the first and second world wars. The latter period ushered in a “golden age” of Canadian diplomacy and peacekeeping with which this nation made its welcome mark throughout the world, and greatly strengthened its own sense of common purpose in the process.

The conditions now may be even more propitious and promising for Canadian initiative, creativity and enterprise in order-building, backed by strong Canadian credibility, human and material resources. Many Canadians will be diffident about any such international mission, because self-skepticism is an even more popular Canadian game than *Trivial Pursuit*, but there are few foreigners who would question this country’s unique credentials. Surely in an era when the Berlin wall and Nicolae Ceausescu can fall, even Canadian skeptics should be susceptible to inspiration.

DISMANTLING THE COLD WAR

Although we do have substantial opportunities and responsibilities, it would be unrealistic to expect dramatic Canadian leadership in ending the Cold War.

Mikhail Gorbachev, a revolutionary Soviet leader and visionary world leader, has basically set the agenda and the pace, and that is fully appropriate from a Canadian viewpoint. It was Soviet expansionism and ideological hostility that triggered the Cold War, even though the West has fairly consistently led in the subsequent successive rounds of military modernization. It was thus up to Mr. Gorbachev to begin and lead the process of change, and he has done so. His first stated intentions for domestic and foreign policy reform were greeted with skepticism in the West, but this was apparently just as he had expected. His economic restructuring (*perestroika*) was under-girded and then overtaken by audacious new measures of openness (*glasnost*) and democratization (*democratzia*). In foreign policy, he outlined a sweeping new world-view – imperfectly captured in the English translation as “new thinking.” Both Soviet actions and (very importantly, given their traditions) Soviet rhetoric were substantially changed, in a number of regional conflicts. He made proposals of growing credibility, first, to provide accurate figures on Soviet military expenditures and then to cut troops and equipment, on an asymmetrical basis, both unilaterally and through arms control negotiations with the West. His unleashing, and even prodding, of liberalization and freedom of action for Eastern European states provided further proof of change and immense encouragement.

During 1989, Western governments and publics came to accept the reality of change in Soviet foreign and domestic policies and gradually overcame the long legacy of mistrust bred by previous Soviet initiatives. Different Western countries moved at different speeds in their acceptance of the Gorbachev revolution, and it is noteworthy that the Canadian government was one of the slowest. Perhaps in the tradition of Canada's highly-aggressive advocacy of human rights in East Bloc countries, External Affairs Minister Clark made a statement in January in which his recognition of the progress being made was submerged in a pessimistic appraisal of the ultimately unbridgeable character of the East-West divide. Even while preparing for a prime ministerial visit to

Moscow which would endorse numerous new bilateral agreements, the Canadian posture remained a predominantly negative one. In early May however, Mr. Clark took the Soviet government's release of a prominent family for immigration to Canada as the opportunity for a major address in which he emphasized the Canadian government's recognition of "what can only be called a revolution sweeping Soviet society" and stated "unequivocally" that it is in our interest that Mr. Gorbachev succeed.

Like other Western countries, Canada has had to struggle, throughout the period of accelerated change in Eastern Europe, to find the appropriate and constructive response. It has been important for the West to restrain the tendency to "triumphalist" rhetoric which could backfire and weaken the position of Mr. Gorbachev and the other reformers. All sensible arms reduction possibilities must be pursued as rapidly as possible, in part to help relieve the economic burden on East Bloc countries and our own, recognizing at the same time that such economic benefits will come gradually. The West needs to offer concrete cooperation in trade, investment and technical and managerial assistance wherever reforms will make this productive, but help to restrain the pent-up expectations of Eastern Europeans that rapid prosperity will now follow automatically. Similarly the West must offer substantial "bridging" assistance to help meet vital human needs during the transition period, but do so without creating aid-dependence or delaying the inescapable economic reform, and without encouraging the illusion that a new "Marshall Plan" will be either possible or appropriate for reforming East Bloc countries.

Arms Reductions and the Conversion Challenge

On the arms control and disarmament front, the immediate focal point of world attention is the set of negotiations now underway in Vienna on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), with parallel and related talks on Confidence and Security-building Measures (CSBMs). The CFE talks between all NATO and Warsaw Pact members were formally launched in early 1989. Following initial exchanges of proposals and counter-proposals, they have been put on an accelerated schedule, aiming for agreement by mid 1990. With the Soviet Union accepting the need for asymmetrical reductions in its superior ground strength, and the West agreeing to include combat aircraft and helicopters, cuts in combat manpower in US stationed forces, and a ceiling on American and Soviet personnel stationed outside national territory, the prospects increased for vastly more rapid progress than in any previous talks.

With each subsequent improvement in the political climate there has been talk from various quarters of even deeper cuts, perhaps through a second round of conventional force negotiations, or conceivably even on a unilateral basis. The rapid evolution of the Eastern European situation now suggests that the Warsaw Pact would no longer provide a cohesive framework for full-scale offensive military action even though most of the very powerful Soviet forces are still in place.

On the NATO side, considerable effort has been expended to maintain a cohesive posture for negotiations but there is general political pressure on governments to achieve cuts in military spending as quickly as possible, and there are differences as to how fast the West can safely move. Mrs. Thatcher's government, for example, has been one of the most skeptical about Soviet military reductions, and expressed concern about Washington's announcement of defence budget cuts in the late autumn.

Quite apart from these shifting calculations of the possible needs for military defence in Europe, we will now quickly begin to see differences based on the relative ability of governments to make the economic and labour force adjustments that will come from reductions in military budgets. These expenditures have been a very important part of national economies and reductions will have far-reaching impacts. There is a real danger (even though there is a widespread conviction that military reductions will be of long-term economic benefit) that fear over such disruptions will begin to be a drag on arms reduction measures that would otherwise be possible in the current climate. The problem will be most serious for the Soviet Union and its allies, given their heavier economic and manpower commitments to the military and their already grave problems of economic vitality and adaptability. The Soviets have begun to take special measures to respond, including the setting-up of a National Commission for the Advancement of Conversion, made up of officials, industrial leaders, academics and military officers.

While there has long been discussion about conversion in various circles, in the absence of any serious prospect of arms reduction, they were not taken very seriously. Those hopes (and fears) are now a reality and conversion has become a serious policy issue for all governments. Even Canada, with its relatively small commitment to military expenditure, will feel the impact of any reductions. The severe problems arising from the military base closures in the last budget show how the local and sectoral impact can be particularly pronounced. There is now a serious question, with both technical and

political dimensions, as to how much planning and preparation is possible and necessary before substantial reductions in military expenditure can take place. Some of the advocates of conversion planning, basing themselves on the past success of "military industrial complexes" in maintaining their growth, may have got themselves into a dangerous situation of self-fulfilling prophecy when they now say that conversion planning is a prerequisite to further cuts.

Post-war demobilization experience demonstrates that even massive shifts of labour and production back to the civilian sector can be absorbed, with huge benefit, especially in economies where flexibility and mobility are high. Policies to enhance such mobility, through re-training, and small business and community development assistance, can be very helpful. Conversion planning by firms, communities and individuals is all to the good, but it would do fatal damage to the cause of arms reductions if we were to accept the proposition that none of them could go ahead until a credibly planned alternative future were in place for every enterprise and individual likely to be affected.

In addition to the challenge of conversion, there are two other possible dangers associated with arms control progress which require preparation and response.

A Framework for Managing East-West Change

The first concern is that of dangerous instability in an environment of major arms reductions, unpredictable political convulsions sweeping Eastern Europe, and varied responses among Western countries, including those on the delicate issue of German reunification. Many different forums and relationships in addition to the arms control talks themselves (with their respective NATO and WTO caucuses) come into play as the world attempts to manage different aspects of this multifaceted European change: the European Community plays a role, as do the Council of Europe, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Western European Union and many other organizations with overlapping memberships and agenda.

Obviously US-USSR summits and bilateral negotiations also play a part, although the West Europeans were very forceful (in the lead-up to the December summit) in saying that "Malta is not Yalta;" in other words, that in 1989 they were not prepared to accept dictation to all of Europe from these two great powers.

Moreover, while there is not an excessively romantic response to Mr. Gorbachev's evocation of a "Common European House" and there is a general alertness against any possible ploys to divide Western Europe from its North American allies, there is also a spirit of assertive European self-confidence in the air, verging at times on a kind of European chauvinism. There is now talk, although not in any official circles, as much about an American "push-out" from Europe as any American "pull-out." Neither phenomenon is in fact very likely, but it is in the interests of international stability – and also very much in the Canadian interest – to help manage all these multifarious shifting relationships with as much mutual consultation and sensitivity as possible.

One idea, that has been pursued especially by a member of this Institute, John Toogood, and subsequently in other international discussions, is for the institutionalization of the 35 nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A related idea has now been put forward at the highest official level in President Gorbachev's call for an accelerated Helsinki Summit of leaders of these 35 European and North American countries. These suggestions are based on the benefits of having at least one broad forum where all the relevant countries are brought together to provide for basic political communication at the same time that other, more specific negotiations proceed in specialized arenas. While Mr. Gorbachev's objectives in the single 35 nation summit are not entirely clear – except, perhaps, the formal endorsement of a new Conventional Forces Agreement – a goal of institutionalizing regular meetings of the 35 at official or ministerial levels would be to keep the channels open. Such sessions would not necessarily be limited to the same "baskets" as the earlier talks, but should be able to range over the gamut of political, military, economic and social concerns among these countries. There would, of course, be difficulties and dangers in formalizing the CSCE process on a continuing basis, but the dangers of fragmentation, poor communications or instability during this exhilarating but challenging period of transition would seem even greater.

Other countries must also be drawn into the improved international climate emanating from Europe. It will be particularly important, from several points of view, to encourage improved relations between Japan, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. Few Westerners are aware that relations between the Soviets and the Japanese have undergone little of the improvement experienced by Western Europeans and North Americans. Confrontational military

postures between the two countries remain unchanged, although Soviet strength has been reduced in both the Mongolian and Chinese border regions; the territorial dispute over the four Northern Islands continues to fester; and Tokyo rankles because its interests and concerns have never been treated sufficiently seriously by Moscow. Given Japan's economic superpower status, and the key role it will now play in any major international economic decisions – as well as its crucial interest in the whole arena of Pacific security – it is a high priority to harmonize all “Western” (including Japanese) approaches to improved East-West relations. Canada is well-placed to pursue this special dialogue with Japan in the context of the Summit Seven and elsewhere.

The “Hangover” Scenario for Eastern Europe

The falling dominoes of oppression and stagnation across Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1989, most graphically symbolized by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and sweeping through country after country in a euphoric tidal wave, cannot go on at the present pace.

In some countries, (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) new power-holders are already faced with the stupendous challenges of government and rehabilitation, with limited experience, sparse resources, unbearably high public expectations and a Pandora’s box of ethnic, ideological, religious and other tensions. Other countries (East Germany, Bulgaria and finally, even Romania) may soon move to the same position. Although Lech Walesa openly expressed his preference for a more gradual transition to non-Communist administration, it is difficult to visualize how such a revolutionary tide could ever have been channelled and regulated.

Ironically, while it was the Soviet Union’s dynamic and visionary leader who permitted and encouraged the collapse of Communist monopolies of power in neighbouring countries, it is in the USSR itself that reform has bogged down. With the explosive difficulties of the Soviet Union’s diverse nationalities erupting on many fronts, the reformers have become more and more vulnerable to the accusation by conservatives that they have jeopardized order and the very integrity of the state. Simultaneously, the painfully slow progress of economic restructuring – which still leaves most Soviet citizens worse off materially than they were four years ago – has now eroded President Gorbachev’s support to the point that he has attempted to postpone further reforms.

So far, in both the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the determination to reduce military burdens has not flagged: budget and troop strength reductions are moving ahead and the production of major weapons has begun to slow. Here, too, there is a risk that this disruption and diminution of the military sector could trigger military rebelliousness which, if coalesced with other anti-reform interests, could threaten internal backlash and reversion to confrontational foreign policies.

With all these factors in flux and a huge variety of politico-military scenarios in play, Western planners are clearly perplexed, and inclined to caution. The traditional scenarios of war being triggered by a Soviet invasion into Western Europe seem more and more fanciful, although it will take the successful conclusion and implementation of the Conventional Forces talks next summer to start finally putting this fear to rest. How will the Soviet Union deal now with its large contingents of troops stationed in other Warsaw Pact countries (some 600,000 in all) when it has been assumed that a large part of their *raison d'etre* was to assure stability of the Communist regimes and Soviet hegemony, goals which have now been effectively abandoned by Moscow? Once again, while the Soviet Union may no longer consider it affordable or necessary to maintain its ring of client states, it must be assumed that Moscow will still perceive a vital interest in preventing any of those neighbours from taking on a hostile military posture or alignment. There is no Western interest in encouraging any such provocative development.

While there is still a long way to go in conventional arms negotiations (and a practical problem on all sides in dealing with the specific negotiating questions as fast as the political momentum would now permit) – and while even less progress has yet been made on nuclear disarmament and practically none on naval arms control – it is clear that the management of East-West relations can now move, as NATO ministers have recognized, much more to the political and economic arenas.

Whether we like it or not, the "building-down" of the two alliance structures in Europe is going to be a relatively slow and carefully balanced process. Paradoxically, both the disarmament process and the remaining structures may provide a modicum of stability against some of the more dangerous eventualities emerging from destabilizing change and painful adjustment in Eastern Europe. For the rest, practi-

cal and genuine economic and technical cooperation, together with open political and cultural channels to Eastern Europe are probably the most effective weapons the West can deploy against new dangers or a reversion to the old confrontation. The West cannot and should not be expected to lower its defenses unilaterally wherever a plausible threatening capability remains arrayed against it. By the same token, however, it would be a mistake of monumental historic proportions to miss or delay any opportunity, in this unprecedented climate of promise.

The West should reciprocate and encourage every realistic disarmament measure. Western failure to do so, or to innovate wherever possible in this climate could at some point provide a dangerous pretext to those in the East who resist improved East-West relations. Similarly, those in the West whose values, prejudices or interests may lead them to drag their feet cannot be allowed to slow the overall Western response in seizing these historic opportunities for positive change. As early as January 1990, a new window for progress may be opened with the NATO/Warsaw Pact discussions on military doctrine which, if they go well, could lead to negotiations on mutually acceptable restructuring of the forces, on both sides, for "defensive defence."

The Qualitative Race: Modernization Goes On

There are other dangers that have not yet been touched by the welcome prospect of major East-West disarmament measures, and they need to be confronted quickly and squarely, with Canada playing its part as required. With substantial cuts coming in the accumulations of conventional arms in the European region, it is obvious that the military planners and negotiators on both sides will still be seeking to maintain the most modern equipment permissible under the new quantitative limits. There will be a process of "culling" older and more ineffective equipment and still a very strong competitive impetus to modernize the remaining arms. Up to a certain point, arms control negotiators may even share a tacit professional interest in permitting this process. When it is recognized that each successive generation of weaponry in recent times has tended to multiply the destructive force of its predecessor, the potential for further *qualitative* arms races is amply clear.

The challenge of trying to put some cap on weapons modernization has not yet been seriously introduced, in spite of all the improvement in the general climate, and Canada has a significant and legitimate interest in pursuing the question. Some of the major

Canadian concerns of recent years about both general strategic stability and developments with potential direct impacts on Canada's security have related to the modernization of weapons systems.

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) with its counterpart Soviet projects, has been one such major concern – on which no Canadian government could offer unqualified support or unconditional participation. It may be significant, and promising for a future abandonment of such projects by the superpowers, that US Defence Secretary Cheney's recent budget proposals suggested some reduction in these expenditures and those on the B2 "Stealth" bomber. It can be safely assumed that the superpowers are acutely aware of each others' activities in these "modernization" projects and that any slowdowns will be tacitly linked or at least reciprocally tuned, even prior to formal agreements. Like "Stealth bomber" technologies, however, the development and extension of cruise missile technology demand urgent attention and action – and Canada is directly involved in both the development and the subsequent potential military fallout. So far, only the most tentative opening has been made toward arms control on sea-launched cruise missiles (although the air-launched variety has been more fully integrated) in the START talks, and Canada took a further step in its own involvement, in early 1989, with the approval for US testing of the Advanced (Stealth) Cruise Missile over Canadian territory.

With solid progress now practically assured on both strategic missile and conventional force reductions, and the marked improvement in East-West relations generally, an issue like cruise testing has lost some of its political immediacy in this country, but it could well re-emerge more powerfully than ever. The majority of Canadians who were uncertain and divided during previous national debates over cruise missile testing, would clearly be much more difficult to convince of the need and legitimacy of further modernization in the current international climate. Canada has an urgent and direct interest in seeing cruise missiles (particularly the sea-launched variety) fully included in East-West arms control and reduction negotiations. This concern is shared by NATO as a whole, but progress is blocked by the dogmatic resistance of the US Navy, which has also, so far, blocked virtually all other attempts at naval arms control. There is no reason why Canada should accept and be expected to cooperate indefinitely in a situation which is detrimental to its own security interests.

It should also be recalled that, as recently as April and May 1989, NATO was embroiled in an intense dispute over the modernization

of Short Range Nuclear Forces (SNF), with the Federal Republic of Germany opposing the modernization which was supported by the US and UK. Canada was in the middle on this question and was able to help find a compromise approach calling for the "partial" reduction of SNF and deferral of modernization. This issue is scheduled to re-emerge but, it is clear that in the changed context in the two Germanies, the paramount German interest will prevail, and other NATO countries will have to accommodate it.

Canada and other NATO member countries may also have direct and urgent stakes in particular issues. They need to define their positions, and be prepared to press their case, ideally even while the conventional force and strategic arms negotiations are still underway.

Verification and "Open Skies"

In the whole field of arms control and disarmament, it is also worth noting that Canada has achieved a leading capability in one area, that of verification techniques. A low-key technical programme maintained in the Department of External Affairs since 1983 has suddenly become a key resource internationally with the upsurge of serious arms control negotiations. Other governments will now quickly invest in this work as well, often drawing on the Canadian effort, and Ottawa's unusual strength in the field will thus not remain uncontested for long, but it remains a valuable and creditable contribution.

The verification investment has also led Canada to take a leading role in developing and pursuing the "open skies" concept, now to be the subject of a major international conference in Ottawa in February 1990. There are still some major clarifications required as to the objective of this exercise, and with the availability of modern satellite technology, "open skies" is intended more as a political "confidence-building" measure than a military surveillance system, but even in the latter function, Canadian verification experts had become aware that it could have great specific utility.

Secretary Baker's proposal to take advantage of the Ottawa gathering of all NATO and WTO foreign ministers to focus as well on the acceleration of political and arms control progress should have the effect of greatly increasing the interest and importance of the meeting, and also of the successful conclusion of an "open skies" agreement.

Surplus Arms: The Danger of Diversion

A possible unintended consequence of progress in East-West arms control and disarmament is the danger that demobilized weaponry and military equipment, if not destroyed, will become available for sales and transfers to armies and armed groups in other parts of the world. Similarly, unless the military production capabilities of countries in East and West are dismantled or decisively cut back under new agreements, they will have even greater incentives than in the past to direct their products to other markets. Such "market development" has always been pursued in part to maintain efficient production lines and adequate returns, and there will be even more pronounced tendencies to the predatory competition, corrupt sales practices and shocking diversion of scarce resources from other key needs in importing countries that have long characterized the international arms business.

The corruptive potential of the arms business was vividly illustrated by a comment of the losing contender for a major arms contract in India which played such a part in the defeat of the Congress (I) government. The former managing director of the Austrian armaments firm said "It is absolutely normal in this business to pay generals and politicians if you want to win the contract. [We lost] because Bofors offered to pay more than we did."¹

Significantly, this very large and scandal-ridden arms deal was made by a Swedish firm, a reminder that this trade is by no means restricted to superpower exporters. Solid superpower agreements against the diversion of demobilized weaponry will be insufficient to ensure that East-West disarmament provides benefits, rather than negative fallout, to other parts of the world. The prominence in the arms trade of countries such as France, China, Britain, FRG, Italy, Brazil, Israel, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden as arms exporters is ample evidence that this traffic respects neither ideological nor geographical lines, and that broad and effective multilateral agreement will be necessary to reduce it and its pernicious effects. For the first time, serious action on disarmament by the major alliances places them in a legitimate position to press others to join in limiting the spread of weapons.

In the past, the two superpowers were prepared to consider reciprocal limitations on conventional arms transfers even at times when their mutual relations were poor and their competition intense in Third World arenas. Now that they are actively cooperating to quell some regional conflicts, and cutting back on arms flows into some others, there

is a possibility of enlisting them both in a focussed effort to negotiate an arms transfer limitation regime. This should be done in parallel with measures to meet the real security concerns of the potential importers, and in concert with other sellers. It is time for such a campaign to be launched, and Canada would be well-placed, perhaps with a small group of other countries from all regions, to seize and develop new initiatives in this direction. One such initiative which might now be realistic, would be to promote regional confidence-building forums which, on the European model, might lead into arms control and arms transfer negotiations.

For a period, after the 1987 Defence White Paper, it appeared that Ottawa might sponsor a concerted campaign to promote growth in Canadian military industrial production and exports, and 1989 saw an intense debate over the international ARMX exhibition in Ottawa. It now seems that Canada's position has stabilized as a medium to small scale arms exporter (ranking about 13th in the world), supplying mainly US and other NATO countries, and attempting to prevent flows to regimes engaged in conflict or human rights violations. Such a position – where the country has just enough stake to be able to assess credibly the costs of limitations – is a good base from which to undertake useful initiatives.

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY: OPEN SEASON?

Commitments and Resources

In the course of 1989 it became clear that, however difficult and unpleasant the task, another comprehensive review and basic rethinking of Canadian defence policy is now inescapable. One critical reason is that the spring Budget so dramatically reduced and postponed the spending commitments for re-equipping the Canadian forces that the framework of the 1987 Defence White Paper no longer held any prospect of reconciling Canadian defence capabilities and commitments. There is a widespread expectation that the defence allocation, which was not actually reduced in the 1989 budget, could be singled out again (with official development assistance) in 1990 when the few "discretionary" categories of federal spending will once more be vulnerable to Draconian spending cuts. The second, and even more important, reason for a re-thinking is found in the dramatic evolution of East-West relations and the prospects for equally dramatic change in Canadian military "threat perceptions" and responsibilities.

So far, the global political changes underway do not appear to have reached the point of materially altering military planners' calculations of capabilities and potential threats. However, with the Conventional Forces negotiations proceeding rapidly in Vienna, with substantial reductions in tanks and other equipment expected to be agreed by summer 1990, it would be totally unrealistic for any government in the position of Canada's, to proceed with a major acquisition such as the promised new battle tanks for the Canadian Forces in Germany. Canadian participation, through our NATO contingent has taken on heightened political importance by helping buffer European-US relations during the all-important process of East-West negotiations and the reductions that will follow. However, there is no question that the outcome of those negotiations will soon have a major impact on the overall importance of a Canadian contingent and/or on its designated roles. Either way, Canadian foreign and military policy, while impelled to maintain a steady course during this negotiating phase, must explore a range of highly unpredictable future options, in a field where decisions have long lead-times and very high price tags.

While the commitment of the Canadian contingent to Europe has long been a cornerstone of Canada's security and defence policy, based on collective defence, there are several additional key imperatives, each of which is also subject to tremendous pressures and change. Although the government tried for some months after the Budget to maintain that the White Paper framework was still intact, it attempted to produce a basic "update" of this framework, and the Prime Minister in November conceded that the 1987 policy was an outdated one.

The extraordinary challenge now, in a period of tremendous political fluidity in the world, and scarce budgetary resources, is to arrive at some decisions that will provide Canada's defence planners, and the personnel of the Canadian Armed Forces, with reasonably clear and stable directions and credible assurance that they will be equipped to carry out the tasks assigned to them. For this challenge to be met, there is now no alternative to an in-depth public debate of policy needs and options — a rarity in the defence field. The 1987 White Paper and its subsequent history shows that citizens and taxpayers are no longer prepared to take on faith the simplified picture of threats, responses and Canadian responsibilities that sufficed at the height of the Cold War. This Institute's own public opinion studies, however, demonstrate that Canadians are still supportive of prudent defence and responsible cooperation with allies. On this basis we, and others, are committed to providing a forum and well-prepared input for serious public debate on defence policy over the crucial months ahead.

Issues for Informed Debate

Since informed public debate will now provide the best defence for Defence, it is essential for a much wider group of Canadians to begin to understand a number of the basic factors, principles and issues surrounding Canadian security and defence policy so that they can begin to think through the implications.

- As the defence White Paper acknowledged, the country's security is comprised of three inter-related components: defence policy and programmes; arms control and disarmament possibilities; and conflict resolution activities including peacekeeping. Much more than was recognized in the White Paper, a positive environment for the latter two sets of activities can ultimately reduce the need for defence and/or result in different sets of demands and operations.
- While Canadians are accustomed to thinking of our military expenditure as very modest (and it certainly takes a lower share of our GNP

than in most Warsaw Pact and NATO countries) Canada actually ranks about twelfth in the world in its total military expenditure and sixth in NATO – enough resources for very substantial military capabilities. In the size of our armed forces, on the other hand, we rank about 48th, and it is well-known that the Canadian forces consider much of their equipment to be inferior and dated. Even allowing for the fact that many larger military forces rely on conscripts, and that the size of Canada's territory imposes additional costs, there is a clear need to examine how Canada's defence capability can achieve the highest cost-effectiveness over the longer-term. For example, can and should Canada try to maintain a fully balanced (and full-time professional) force capability, and a full-fledged national military infrastructure? Alternatively, is it necessary and possible for a middle power to seek specialized "niches" of excellence in defence as we must in other areas? How do these questions relate to the particular defence roles that Canada already has in hand or in prospect?

- For most kinds of potential strategic military threats, a number of which will be with us for a long time to come, Canadian territory and airspace are inseparably linked with those of the United States. This fact dictates the requirement for cooperation on many continental defence requirements, and a Canadian need to influence US policies where vital Canadian interests are different. Conversely, US vital interests will also need to be taken into account in Canadian policies – implying the continuing search for compromise in this distinctly asymmetrical relationship.
- Even with major success in East-West arms reduction, confidence-building and normalization, the North Atlantic Alliance is likely to remain an important umbrella framework for Western European/North American political, security and defence cooperation. While to date this cooperation has mainly taken the form of North American contingents and reinforcement capabilities for Europe, and joint naval operations, it is possible that the Western Europeans will take a greater share of a reduced overall burden of European defence in future. This raises the possibility of a smaller direct North American contribution in Europe, but also conceivably a strengthened European naval and air participation in NATO's North American area.
- The Canadian Arctic is taking on a much more central place in Canadian security and defence policy. From a broad security point of view the Arctic represents a major frontier region in East-West relations, with Canada and the Soviet Union having the largest territorial stake. The possibilities for confidence-building, constructive

cooperation and the reduction of security threats should be distinctive Canadian priorities for bilateral and circumpolar action. The potential actions on purely military security issues in the Arctic have up to now been linked by the Government to the wider negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact but there ought to be the possibility for proceeding with at least some of the ideas that have recently been widely canvassed.

- With respect to Canadian defence policy, needs and commitments, it is important to recognize that we have been drawn into a number of demanding and expensive new tasks by the evolution of competing military technologies between East and West. The North Warning System, the emphasis on Forward Operating Locations, Forward Dispersal Bases, low-level flying exercises, and aerospace and submarine surveillance requirements are all developments with major implications for Canadian defence and for the protection of basic Canadian interests in our relations with the United States. Wherever possible, Canada has a legitimate and pressing concern with seeking the reduction or control of technological developments which could increase these demands. Where they cannot be reduced, they will now have to be carefully weighed against competing defence requirements for the allocation of scarce resources.
- For certain kinds of traditional and new international challenges to Canadian security, the appropriate response may not lie in military defence capability, and such new arenas may not be appropriate for Canada-US cooperation. Such challenges include: the assertion and maintenance of Canadian sovereignty; enforcement of Canadian fisheries zones and regulations; environmental surveillance and protection (for example, against oil discharges and spills); coastal surveillance and enforcement capability against drug trafficking or illegal entry; marine regulation, and services such as ice-breaking, search and rescue operations. These other "security" services, particularly in the maritime environment along Canada's vast coastlines, may or may not prove possible to handle in tandem, or "multi-tasked" with more traditionally-defined naval operations. What is certain is that all of these requirements are intensifying while the available resources are not expanding. The public (as various opinion surveys attest) is primarily concerned with seeing these needs met and will have to be convinced that any limits placed on coordination are in fact justified.
- Peacekeeping, which has now involved more than 80,000 Canadian service men and women, has been a substantial part of Canadian defence activity for decades, and an unparalleled Canadian contribution

to international security through the United Nations system. The Canadian role in Cyprus has also played a valuable part in helping avert potential conflict between two NATO allies on the Southern flank. After some years of relative quiescence, UN peacekeeping work has suddenly undergone a huge expansion to respond to the new willingness and encouragement of the major powers to see conflicts resolved under international supervision. Canada has been involved in all of these operations and is relied on for its experience and logistic capabilities, to the point where it has become difficult to consider peacekeeping as a mere "auxiliary" role for the Canadian Armed Forces. This will remain true even if Canada concludes that it cannot take part directly in every future mission, and if some of those missions, like that in Namibia, rely on large proportions of non-military personnel. It remains the case that these functions are a vital part of the international security system, that various kinds of military personnel will remain indispensable for them, and that no country's armed forces have a higher level of experience, capability and acceptability for these tasks than do Canada's. How Canada will now rank these peacekeeping tasks (and the associated ones of international disaster relief) among its security policy priorities will be a key question for the structuring and allocation of our defence resources.

REGIONAL CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Toward Further Marginalization of the Third World?

The improvement in East-West relations is so dramatic and encouraging that it may quickly come to dominate the attention, as well as the available aid and investment resources, of the Western world. Already Western governments are facing severe pressures in trying to meet these new needs while maintaining their stretched commitments in other parts of the world. How these new choices are resolved over the next couple of years by countries like Canada will have far-reaching implications for decades to come.

One good reason for restraining our euphoria at the improved climate of East-West relations and the beginning of substantial NATO/Warsaw Pact arms reductions is that in spite of (or, some would argue, because of) the apocalyptic potential of East-West warfare, none of the 22 millions killed in armed conflict since World War Two have actually been casualties of East-West conflict proper. The toll of conflicts in other regions, however, has been constant and frequently horrific, with civilians being indiscriminate or often even selected targets, large regions being laid waste, and their inhabitants swept up in the wretched tide of refugees that has become a flood in the Horn of Africa, Angola and Mozambique, in Indochina, Afghanistan and Central America.²

The 1980s saw the atrocious eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, in the course of which the world's general taboo against chemical weapons was broken, with pesticide factories converted to the production of chemicals for human extermination. The agonized anarchy of Lebanon continued, creating a terrible new model for the world of generalized inter-factional warfare without apparent purpose or end, and in neighbouring Israel the *intifadah* was for a second year the focus of hostility and brutalization in the still explosive Arab-Israeli conflict, now into its fifth decade. The cancer of ethnic conflict has flared in many parts of the world, with countries like Fiji and Sri Lanka now thoroughly infected. As the decade ended, the United States demonstrated in Panama its continuing readiness to intervene unilaterally, especially in the Western hemisphere, to try to determine the shape of governments in other countries.

The news is not all bad about conflict in the world outside the East-West arena. In fact, there have been huge positive spillovers from the improvement in East-West relations, and there is an unprecedented opening to strengthen systems to enhance world security. There are also major new dangers of regional instability, conflict and war on the horizon. A failure to seize the current opportunity and introduce new systems of order in the Third World could lead, within a few decades, to a world security situation every bit as menacing as that of the Cold War at its height, and much more unstable.

Perhaps, the truly momentous question of our times is not, as the American analyst would have it, whether history is at an end because of the ending of an epic struggle of ideology and arms-building between two major powers of the European/North Atlantic world. Rather, we can ask whether world history will now shift peaceably or less peaceably to reflect the struggles and aspirations of the four-fifths of humanity who have been largely outside these self-preoccupied rivalries among "Europeans."

The "European" world can now either slide from the narcissism of "European confrontation" to that of "European cooperation" or it can seize the chance to examine the world-views of those outside. The billions of people whose countries are not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact are deeply conscious that they have been held as powerless hostages to the threat of global nuclear annihilation because of the hostility between these two blocs. Their own security concerns, as nations and individuals, have been compelling by any standard of human history and they have been left to fester, or even been aggravated by the actions of the two northern blocs.

Leaders and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America will welcome the easing of the global threat of superpower nuclear war. They will watch to see if the thawing of East-West relations, and the reduction of superpower competition in their own regions, will lead to more constructive attention to their problems or, on the other hand, to even greater marginalization of the Third World. If the latter is the case, the result will be an intensification of the pernicious drug traffic, of global environmental degradation, and of international terrorism. The combination of deepening alienation and spreading awareness and technological access in the Third World, together with the vulnerability of modern advanced societies, could well come to represent a primary security threat.

UN Peace-making and Peacekeeping: Opportunity and Challenge

Superpower acquiescence and cooperation has in the past two years allowed the United Nations to play its intended role as peacemaker and peacekeeper in Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Namibia, and now perhaps in Central American and even Cambodia. These roles, originally pioneered and long supported by Canada, had fallen into some political disuse – even with several peacekeeping forces carrying on – but they have returned with increased scope and impact in this new international climate. There is no country better placed than Canada – especially during its term on the Security Council – to take the lead in building on this new opportunity to institutionalize these arrangements.

As 1 April 1989 showed in Namibia – when one of the largest and most important UN operations in history almost miscarried – both the political and technical machinery of the UN for these operations needs to be greatly strengthened. Even though there will always be distinctive problems and time-pressures with each operation, the Namibian experience should be taken as a firm warning that the Secretary-General needs more standing means and authority to plan, prepare and stage UN activities. He also needs the political clout to be able to cut through unnecessary blockages in New York, at the very least to find remedies when delegations have, through their own nitpicking debates and delays, jeopardized agreed deadlines for getting a UN force on the ground. Strong political support is needed, especially from the countries with most experience in sending their nationals on these missions, to back firmer demands by the Secretary-General for his capacity to proceed or, when necessary – even at the cost of sometimes missing an opportunity – to delay proceeding when conditions are dangerously unprepared.

The principal peacekeeping countries, like Canada, now have the right and responsibility to pursue the agenda of possible reinforcements to these systems, in the UN and elsewhere. Timely topics include not only the political processes and bureaucratic resources involved, but also the possibilities of standing reserve forces or nuclei; the establishment of multilateral risk reduction centres; new mediatory functions and facilities; the relationships between UN and regional efforts; possible new powers and new roles for peacekeepers (for example, see page 41 below); new techniques and technologies to aid in peacekeeping; and not least, the more satisfactory financing of these and other activities of the UN.

The diplomatic sensitivity of a number of these issues may make it difficult for governments to push them at first, and this is one reason for the selection of this area as a priority for independent work by the Institute for Peace and Security.

However, it is a key problem for Canadian foreign policy that the United States government remains grudging, laggard and still actively hostile – as Vice President Quayle recently demonstrated – to the United Nations, at this time of extraordinary promise. When even the Soviet Union has now paid most of its outstanding arrears, and launched some very promising (and generally serious) “new thinking” about expanded roles for the UN, it is now a matter of crucial importance for the Western world, and for Canada in particular, to get Washington to discharge its responsibilities and to discard its outdated prejudices in relation to the United Nations. The Mulroney government’s first Speech from the Throne stressed that “Canada’s opportunity to influence the course of the world events lies primarily in sound multilateral institutions” and the Prime Minister said in 1986, “we feel that it is unseemly for the United Nations to have to go around with a tin cup, and we’re not going to allow it.” There is now an even stronger case for this approach as the UN’s useful role has increased and its management improved, as certified to Congress by the US State Department. This is surely one area where Ottawa’s carefully cultivated credibility with Washington, and with the American public, should be mobilized to press for wiser American policies and practices.

Even with several settlements achieved and truces in place, the global list of regional conflicts underway or in prospect is a long and depressing one. In some instances, the self-distancing of the superpowers, overwhelmingly a positive development, will, unless the resulting vacuum is filled by the international community, have the negative side-effect of removing at least occasional pressure for the containment or stabilization of conflict from outside. In a trend which would have continued in any event, regional powers will be testing their potential for local overlordship, and the consequences will be predominantly negative.

A Decade of Proliferation? The Test of Testing

The 1990’s, unless decisive multilateral action is taken to prevent it, will also be the decade of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, even while the superpowers are finally beginning to limit their stocks. The nuclear non-proliferation regime – to be reviewed in 1990 and

either to expire or be renewed in 1995 – is now clearly jeopardized by the aspirations of a growing number of would-be nuclear weapons states, and by persistent political friction over the perceived discriminatory double standard between nuclear weapons states and others.

The modest INF Treaty – the first-ever disarmament measure for nuclear weapons – and the prospects for large quantitative reductions through a START agreement have for the first time in the forty year history of non-proliferation efforts provided some basis for the two main nuclear weapon states to claim that their restraint justifies a similar response by others. Given the vast nuclear arsenals that will remain, however, and continue to be modernized, it is still a slender reed of argument on which to rely, especially when regional security threats and arms races loom so large for a number of the threshold nuclear states.

The prospects for maintaining (and ideally strengthening) the non-proliferation regime are linked with the issue of nuclear testing. Many argue that an effective ban on all testing could simultaneously head off new entrants to the race and show evidence of a decisive capping of “vertical proliferation” by the existing nuclear weapon states. The general issue of testing has also become linked, in the past two years, with a campaign spearheaded by a few governments and non-governmental organizations to force amendment of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and in effect make it the vehicle for a comprehensive ban. There has been sharp controversy over the legitimacy and usefulness of this tactic, and about the wisdom of making it a litmus test for non-proliferation prospects. The Canadian government, for example, opposed the idea of a Partial Test Ban Treaty Amending Conference, arguing that a “direct” approach would be necessary. But like some others, Ottawa has said that it will participate now that the event is to take place.

In fact, Canada’s longstanding general advocacy of a total test ban has been replaced by a “step-by-step” approach in recent years, in obvious recognition of the unyielding resistance of the United States government to such a ban. The United States, with France, has in fact so far continued to vote against the Canadian-sponsored resolution on a step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, undercutting the Canadian government’s attempt to draw Washington into this endeavour on a basis that will respect its legitimate concerns. Canada has also continued to take a leading role in international preparations for verification on testing bans, with the seismic centre in Yellowknife NWT serving as one focus.

In all these multilateral debates and procedural wrangles about conferences on the testing issue and its linkages to non-proliferation, there begins to be a danger of losing sight of the underlying stakes, and the rapid evolution of the situation in the real world. It would be tragic if governments were to become committed to a whole series of positions through middle-level debates among officials which might then impede the kind of decisive step forward at the top political level which might become possible in the current climate.

While Canada and others may have had reservations about the "back door" strategy of using the Partial Test Ban Treaty to promote a wider ban, it might provide a valuable opportunity if key participants are prepared to move from their fixed positions in the current political atmosphere. More generally, as the opinion poll conducted for this Institute in October 1989 powerfully demonstrates, the majority of Canadians (59%) supports a Canadian push for a complete test ban, even against strong US opposition.³ Given the fact that Canadians also rank the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries as the most important potential threat to world peace, the current Canadian approach of gradualism and quiet persuasion is going to come under very serious attack as the issues of nuclear testing and proliferation come into public focus.

If, indeed, the current political momentum of arms control is sustained, and the United States returns to its traditional concern over proliferation, it is conceivable that a dramatic political initiative toward a test ban could, at some point, be launched by Washington, leaving Canada, among others, as a bemused defender of an abandoned American position. If, on the other hand, the American position is to be sustained, even to the point of opposing Canada's own watered-down resolutions, Ottawa has both the right and the need to secure a clear and plausible rationale to explain to the Canadian people and the rest of the world why such a vital political and substantive step toward disarmament cannot be taken in the present, highly-promising atmosphere.

Chemical weapons – the "poor man's nuclear weapon" – represent another proliferation danger that has become alarmingly real and immediate since their verified use in the Iran/Iraq war in 1984 and 1988, and the discovery of Libyan preparations for production (with West German and Japanese technology) in 1988. International negotiations toward a chemical weapons ban have gained momentum and direction, particularly since over 140 countries participated in the Paris Conference on the subject in January 1989. There is still a very long way to

go before an effective and verifiable ban is achieved, however, particularly as the arguments about discrimination and double standards take on a further edge here since a number of Arab states have demanded recognition of their right to possess chemical arms as long as Israel is presumed to have a nuclear weapons capability.

This latter argument for localized "mutually-assured destruction" through horrific weapons systems is made even more ominous by the growing proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and other delivery systems that have greatly increased the potential for mass destruction even with non-nuclear weapons.

In addition to participating in international efforts toward an effective chemical weapons ban, backed by the preventive scrutiny of the "Australia Group" of chemical suppliers, Canada has now taken steps to demonstrate the defensive character, and safety, of its own chemical weapons research, including the visit of a Soviet delegation to its Suffield, Alberta installation in July 1989. Ottawa has also turned its attention very usefully to the problem of verification, which will be an especially difficult one in a chemicals ban. Before a satisfactory regime to control this threat is reached, Canada and other countries will have to make a substantial political and technical investment – with an eye always as well to the possible re-emergence of biological agents and toxins as usable weapons.

Arms Transfers

There is an ever present danger that Third World conflicts will be stoked or escalated by growing flows of conventional armaments (and reference has already been made to the need to prevent the diversion of equipment or export capacity to these markets as an unintended side-effect of East-West arms reductions; see p.12). Perhaps largely as a consequence of the economic difficulties of many developing countries, their aggregate arms imports have not in recent years continued the rapid growth patterns of some earlier periods. The total exports of major weapons to Third World countries in 1988 totalled some US \$21 billion, as compared to US \$27.6 billion in 1987 and an average of US \$22.2 billion annually in the 1984–1986 period.⁴

While these aggregate figures may reflect some measure of political and/or budgetary restraint among Third World governments, there can be little doubt that those faced with what they consider critical external or internal security problems will somehow squeeze out the

resources necessary to secure arms. Furthermore, they can argue, attempts to limit their arms acquisitions represent an indefensible double standard when industrial countries devote very much larger resources, both absolutely and in many cases relatively, to military ends. This factor will be an important obstacle to achieving any kind of arms traffic limitation regime, as will the difficulty of achieving genuine restraint and compliance among the various sales-hungry suppliers.

However, it appears that among a number of developing countries there is a growing resistance to excessive military influence and expenditure. Simultaneously international aid donors and institutions are becoming less tolerant of the negative macro-economic impact of military expenditures and imports in troubled, debt-ridden economies. The movement toward some limitations on Third World arms expenditures and imports will depend on a recognition of the legitimate security concerns of many countries, and the promotion of confidence-building and arms limitation schemes among them, together with effective supply restraints and conflict resolution mechanisms. As the specific conflicts discussed below demonstrate, even serious pressure on the arms supply to belligerents does not necessarily lead to any quick resolution and diminution of armed conflict. However, over time, more effective restraints would certainly reduce the destructive toll, if not the incidence of these eruptions.

Canada and Five Regions of Conflict

As the 1990s dawned, there were some two dozen substantial violent conflicts underway in the world in which Canada had a significant interest, and some potential for influence. Even countries which claim global reach and responsibility have recognized that their means of influence are limited in the face of such a panorama of conflict. Thus Canada, as a middle power, must be supportive of collective multi-lateral efforts to alleviate and resolve all conflicts, while focussing Canadian energies on those few conflict situations where this country might make the most positive difference. This selection is always a matter of judgement and debate, and the effort of aspiring peacemakers to contribute to peaceful resolution is almost always met with complexity, frustration and frequently with suspicion and hostility. Five regions of current conflict are discussed briefly below — they are not necessarily those of most importance from a Canadian point of view, nor those where the potential Canadian contribution to resolution is most promising, but each raises key questions and possibilities as the decade turns.

Most of these wars demonstrate the ugly complexity of protracted conflicts, where reprisal heaps on recrimination, where human lives are expended without concern or with cold calculation for tactical or propaganda advantage, and where peacemakers may become targets if they cannot be enlisted by one protagonist or other. These conflicts may now test the ability of even great powers acting together to restrain their erstwhile clients and secure peace. Further, some of them at least will test the ingrained assumptions of the international community to the effect that stopping all "external intervention" and encouraging majority self-determination are always the best routes to peace.

Central America: Peace Plan in the Balance

After years of misery and deprivation, and a decade of active warfare in the nineteen eighties, Central America has had high hopes for peace in the 1990s. The laborious processes of the regional peace plans of Contadora and Esquipulas had finally led in 1989 to preparations for Nicaraguan elections under international observation, a ceasefire, and the demobilization of the *contra* rebels. Linked to this process in Nicaragua was the winding down of outside intervention in the region and the reduction of conflicts and human rights violations in El Salvador and Guatemala.

In November 1989, with election preparations proceeding in Nicaragua and a steady flow of complaints about Sandinista intimidation and armed *contra* incursions, President Ortega announced that his forces would no longer observe the ceasefire with the *contras* and launched new offensives against them. He stated that election preparations would proceed unhindered, while the opposition and many international observers expressed grave concern. Almost immediately, in El Salvador, following the worst in a prolonged series of death-squad attacks on opposition and labour groups, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerillas broke off their negotiations and launched a new offensive against the government. This major onslaught, carried audaciously into the heart of San Salvador, triggered the death-squad style murder of six Jesuit priests involved in peace efforts, and also provoked government forces to particularly brutal attacks on civilian neighbourhoods and to harassment, arrests and torture of foreign relief and human rights workers, including some Canadians. By the time this offensive was finished, over 2,000 more Salvadorians had died, and the rabid obscenity of the conflict has depressed and disgusted all but the most fanatical adherents or apologists of either side.

Perhaps surprisingly, against this discouraging background, the five Central American Presidents again managed to salvage hope for the peace process in a mid-December summit. The Presidents placed their hopes in a strengthening of the UN/OAS role in ensuring the disbanding of Nicaraguan *contra* groups and FMLN rebels in El Salvador, with measures to stem the flow of arms to both sets of insurgents. This agreement was broadly in line with the tone of the Malta Summit discussion, where Presidents Gorbachev and Bush avoided dispute, with Mr. Bush pointedly accepting Soviet assurances of non-intervention and placing the responsibility for arms flows into El Salvador squarely on Nicaragua and Cuba.

The year-end decision of the United States to intervene militarily in Panama to overthrow the Noriega Government has re-opened a major set of dangers while finally dislodging this corrupt and constitutionally-illegitimate ruler. Many factors played a part: Noriega's probable criminality, the blatant fraud, sabotage and nullification of last May's elections, the failure of the Organization of American States (OAS) to achieve his peaceful removal, the Panamanian "declaration of war" and clear aggressive threats against American citizens, and the imminent appointment of Panamanian to head the Canal administration. In spite of all these factors, the international community, and particularly Latin Americans, (given their history) cannot accept Washington's unilateral interventions to dictate who shall govern in other countries. The 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (under which Washington claimed the right to intervene where "disorder or misconduct" occurred in the hemisphere) was supposedly repudiated in the 1920s.

Given the real stakes, and the factors at work, the Panamanian case was a genuinely thorny one for Washington, but one of the consequences of intervening will be to feed again the already-ingrained suspicion and hostility that underlies many American relationships and inhibits US effectiveness in pursuing its own and Western interests. There will be immediate spillover into other Central American issues, weakening the useful contributions that Washington can bring, and perhaps further jeopardizing the regional peace process. For Canada, the intervention provided an early, and messy, real-world test of our new membership in the OAS and the unpleasant choices it will place before us. Weighing all the factors involved, as well as the certainty that few other countries would be prepared to lend credence to the US point of view, the Canadian government made the difficult decision to offer cautious support, with some qualifications that were quickly lost in the debates. It was a very unfortunate first issue for Canada in the OAS, a

clear reminder that it can be a polarized environment with special difficulties for Canada. In a less murky case of US intervention, such as has often occurred in the past, any Canadian government can be expected to take the opposite view, which too will have its consequences.

In Canada, which is one of the select group of countries that has been acceptable to all parties as a supplier of official observers, this further faltering of the peace process has caused deep concern – and temporarily obstructed the work of the Canadian observer team. From a Canadian perspective, there are still plausible hopes for a reasonably free and fair election in Nicaragua, and its certification as such may provide an opening for stabilization and normalization in that part of the region. It will be a longer and more difficult task to help El Salvador to emerge from its morass of violence and oppression.

Southern Africa: More Grounds for Hope

The conflict-wracked region of Southern Africa, where Canadian foreign policy has had a substantial focus throughout the past five years, has taken important steps forward in 1989. There is more hope on the horizon, although it is by no means assured, and the legacy of destruction is still a harrowing one.

The most substantial advance is in Namibia, where a confluence of factors – not least the agreement of the superpowers – finally permitted the process of peace and independence to proceed under the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. Canada had been on the Security Council at that time, and played an important part in designing this framework. Eleven years later, Canada was serving another term as the Plan was implemented, and we also took a substantial part on the ground. The UN task of assuring the cessation of hostilities, the holding of free and fair elections to a constituent assembly, and the transition to independence from illegal South African occupation has been one of the most ambitious and, on balance, most successful projects ever undertaken by the world organization. It had some perilous moments, and there are important lessons to be absorbed about the planning and execution of such operations, but the world can legitimately rejoice in a major achievement with potential beneficial effects in all countries of the region, including South Africa itself.

Direct superpower pressure, of course, played a crucial role in achieving the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, to which the South African withdrawal and the Namibian settlement were linked. There has been on-again, off-again progress toward resolving the conflict in

Angola itself, with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels still strong and receiving outside support, principally from South Africa and the United States, and the Angolan government too drained by war to provide even essential services to its battered and decimated population.

The situation in Mozambique is even worse, where unremitting warfare between the government and RENAMO rebels has now uprooted a large share of the total population, shattered the country's capacity even to feed itself, cost some half million lives, 90% of them civilians, and maimed and injured countless numbers. Even after the Nkomati accord was signed with South Africa in 1984, this hemorrhaging war continued as proof that Pretoria was unwilling or unable to control powerful groups in the country in their support of this most systematic example of destabilization. More recently, even growing American and British sympathy and support for Mozambique, and more restrained South African policies at home and in Namibia/Angola have not led to any marked reduction in the ruinous war in Mozambique.

There, as elsewhere in the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) countries, the Canadian government has come to recognize that relief and development efforts are almost pointless when their effects are so vulnerable to obliteration by warfare. While still not going as far as Britain, which is providing military training, or Zimbabwe, which provides direct and substantial military support, Canada is now providing "non-lethal" assistance to help provide security for transportation routes and other facilities in Mozambique.

Even though there may now be some legitimate question as to how much and how quickly the South African authorities could restrain RENAMO, there is no doubt that a stabilization of the South African internal situation with a firm and satisfactory commitment to the ending of *apartheid* will result in a diminution of all the remaining conflicts in the region. The new leadership in Pretoria, and the majority of white South African opinion, is still very far from accepting a fully non-racial democratic future for the country, but 1989 has seen progress that even the most hardened skeptics now concede to be dramatic.

Apart from the *de facto* relaxation of some of the most repressive measures by the regime – it should be noted that the state of emergency, press censorship, "banning" etc. remain formally in place – perhaps the most impressive development has been the statesmanlike

approach maintained by the opposition, including and most notably the ANC leaders released after 25 years in prison, and Nelson Mandela, the paramount leader, who remains in custody. The total lack of rancour and the spirit of reconciliation exhibited by these people is so exceptional that hope is possible for an enduring resolution in South Africa even with the huge obstacles of institutionalized racism and race privilege still to be overcome.

There is also hope in the fact that the non-violent pressure of the outside world, through significant economic and other sanctions, has reinforced internal pressures to the point of making basic change more possible – a fact that is clear in spite of some of the lingering debates among some Western leaders. Backsliding or blockages are entirely possible, of course, in which case these pressures may yet have to be intensified.

The Middle East

1989 saw no reduction in the bitter and longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Palestinian uprising or *intifada* in the occupied territories continuing to result in widespread casualties and disorder, to focus world attention and considerable sympathy on the Palestinians' cause, and to provoke profound disquiet and debate among Israelis. Reflecting a new level of Palestinian optimism and confidence, Yasser Arafat and the PLO were prepared to accept a resolution to moderate the organization's territorial demands and its refusal to accept the state of Israel, saying in French that the PLO charter is "caduque" (obsolete). The PLO was able to establish a more formal and high-level dialogue with Western countries including the US (on 14 December 1988) and much later (on 30 March 1989) with Canada, but efforts to gain further formal recognition in key international organizations for the "State of Palestine" (declared in November 1988) were met with firm opposition and blocked by the US.

The Israeli cabinet came forward in mid-year with a peace plan based on the election of Arab spokesmen (excluding the PLO) who would then negotiate for measures of autonomy. Sometimes heated debate around this proposal between the Israeli and American governments, and then with others concerned, stretched over the following months without any resolution by year-end, but with Egypt coming to support a modified version and attempting to gain acceptance by the PLO. Although there is some hope in these developments, it remains clear that there is profound fear among many Israelis (beyond the extremists who promote annexation and deportation) as to the

trustworthiness of the PLO, the containability of any two-state solution, and the wider prospects for the acceptance of Israel by its numerous Arab neighbours. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the stakes have now been raised on both sides of this conflict (which has erupted into large-scale war four times in living memory) by Israel's presumed acquisition of nuclear weapons capability and the increasing accessibility of chemical weapons and delivery capability among its neighbours.

The *intifada*, the intensifying repression used against it by Israeli authorities, and the modified positions of the PLO have all seemed to weaken the tolerance for an inflexible Israeli government position among many Israelis and among many of Israel's firm supporters abroad. Such an effect is, of course, welcomed and encouraged by the PLO and its supporters. At root, nonetheless, the Israeli negotiating position will remain very strong, as will support from the United States and some other countries, when real negotiations for a secure settlement are finally launched. While shifts in the balance of outside sympathies do make some difference, it will only be a shift within Israel itself that will make serious negotiation possible.

The contributions of a country like Canada to progress are likely to be limited, since Canada's real influence on any of the protagonists is small and the creative debate about possibilities for resolution has been severely circumscribed in Canada. Some organizations of the Canadian Jewish community seem to fear that open debate of alternatives to official Israeli policy will lead inevitably to erosion of Canadian support for Israel. There is now, however, a significant counter-lobby which has been able to insist that the Palestinian case and/or the need for basic change be heard by Canadians.

Canada, with a good track record in contributing to peacemaking and peacekeeping around the world and with strong instinctive sympathy for Israel and its concerns and a growing commitment to the rights and needs of Palestinians, would be well-placed to make a useful contribution in the eventual resolution of this conflict. It seems likely, however, that the explosive polarization of the domestic debate will render this extremely difficult. Efforts will continue to be made by this Institute, and presumably others, to promote knowledge and understanding of the evolving situation and awareness of the emerging options for international action.

Another Middle East crisis which seized Canadian attention in 1989 was the further slide of Lebanon into anarchic, multi-factional

warfare, killing and wounding thousands, flattening large parts of Beirut, and creating huge flows of desperate refugees. In mid-year the merciless bombardments between the forces of General Michel Aoun and the Syrian army led to outpourings of concern in Canada as elsewhere, and demonstrations and delegations of Lebanese Canadians in which the disparate sections of the community were even able to come together to appeal for Canadian assistance. After much international consultation at the United Nations and elsewhere it clearly emerged that the Arab League was the best-placed agent to attempt to secure a truce and mediate further progress toward some enduring resolution. The worst of the fighting has again been interrupted and new efforts made to secure a viable Lebanese political leadership, even after the ghastly setback of the assassination of President Rene Mouawad, just 17 days after his inauguration.

Whatever arrangements are now possible to restore some measure of law and orderly government it is clear that the conflict in Lebanon is extremely deep-rooted, with many external and internal ramifications and profound political, socio-religious, and economic dimensions inside the country. Resolution will require constructive attention to all these aspects both within and outside the country. This Institute has made a major commitment to attempt to help with an extensive consultative process over the next two years.

On one other front in the volatile region, there was very little progress made in 1989 in implementing the 1988 UN Resolution which established a cease-fire to the eight year Iran-Iraq war, with a contingent of Canadians still participating in the UN Observer Group. Responding to a new stage in the Iranian incitement to international terrorism, Canada withdrew its charge d'affaires from Teheran in February (7 months after re-establishing official relations with Iran) following Ayatollah Khomeini's call for the assassination of author Salman Rushdie over his book "Satanic Verses."

The Horn of Africa

Perhaps nowhere in 1989 did the vicious combination of warfare, famine and dislocation come together so devastatingly as in the Horn of Africa. Wars rage on in Sudan, Somalia and on two fronts in Ethiopia, and former US President Jimmy Carter, who has been attempting to mediate, best captured the total impact in his comment on Sudan:

"More people perished as a result of the conflict than all other wars [in the world last year] combined. Perhaps a quarter of a

million people died: some directly from bullets, bombs, mines and shells. But the tragedy of it is many more died from starvation and disease, the indirect result of war."⁵

Focussing mainly on Ethiopia, the outside world is trying desperately once again to find adequate resources for emergency food supplies, and to secure effective assurances, particularly from the Ethiopian government, that these supplies will be allowed to go through to areas controlled by the Eritrean and Tigrean rebels.

In support of a wide range of peace making efforts now underway, the Soviet Union has signalled that its previously large supplies of arms to the Mengistu government are no longer assured. The US administration has lent close but informal support to Mr. Carter's mediation efforts. But a series of negotiation meetings on the various fronts all ran into serious snags toward the end of 1989, and the prospect grows ever more immediate that desperately needed relief assistance will not be able to get through in the coming months, and that another gigantic human tragedy will unfold, with the world outside standing by in helpless frustration.

This looming tragedy in the Horn of Africa could provide the most powerful test of the unprecedented improvements in superpower relations, and in the will of the international community to promote greater order and human well-being. Even if parallel, or even joint pressure by the superpowers should not prove adequate in the near-term to expedite negotiated ends to these unwinnable wars, it is not now inconceivable for the international community, through the UN Security Council, to agree that the withholding or disruption of food and relief supplies cannot be used as a weapon, and that appropriate measures will be taken to prevent any such actions. Under the authority of the Security Council, inspectors could certify that relief and humanitarian shipment and convoys contain no military material. They could then maintain liaison with the relevant military command structures on all sides to pass along these assurances, together with information on the routes and timing of shipments. Observers could be deployed along the routes to monitor the free and safe passage of humanitarian supplies, and identify any violators, with the Security Council to determine appropriate sanctions. If these measures were judged insufficient, UN escort forces could be deployed for such shipments and routes.

We recognize that the kinds of function suggested here would constitute a departure for the United Nations and the international

community, and that they would involve risks. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine a more unquestionable humanitarian objective, or a more propitious time, to attempt such an innovation with the full support of the world community. Any such effort could also contribute immensely to the climate for resolution of the conflicts themselves.

Indochina

In spite of intense peace making efforts in 1989, and the Soviet-encouraged withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from the country in September, the conflict in Cambodia continued at year's end, with ominous signs ahead. Following the failure of the Paris conference in August to achieve any breakthrough to peace, fighting again intensified. It also became clear that, through the complex internal and external alliances that have been formed, there is a real danger of the murderous Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot re-emerging as the dominant force in a new government, with the *de facto* acquiescence of the international community.

The situation that has emerged exemplifies the murkiness of the legal, political, moral and tactical issues that can develop in such conflicts and in the international jockeying to which they give rise. Even though the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 displaced the lunatic genocidal regime of Pol Pot, the fact of the invasion and concerns over Vietnamese and Soviet intentions led to widespread non-recognition of the new regime of Hun Sen, and varying degrees of international support for opposition factions.

The Khmer Rouge was explicitly supported by China throughout but with the emergence of a loose coalition of all opposition forces, nominally led by Prince Sihanouk, the vast majority of countries in the United Nations in November 1989 conceded the Khmer Rouge a role in a comprehensive political settlement that ought to be negotiated to provide an interim government and internationally-supervised elections. Canada and most other Western nations were part of this majority – stressing that their goal was not to encourage Khmer Rouge dominance but to accept the inescapable reality of its presence. Finland and Sweden abstained on the resolution in an effort to show a shift in concern from the question of Vietnamese aggression to the threat of Khmer Rouge dominance. Australia and Britain have been at pains to strengthen their links with the Hun Sen government and with Vietnam, with Britain pointedly recognizing that Vietnamese withdrawal has indeed taken place. Canada too has made moves to give some credit and credibility to the Hun Sen government, and stresses that, while still

endorsing the opposition coalition's claim to Cambodia's UN seat, our objective is to achieve a truce and genuine elections in which the Cambodian people would be free to reject the Khmer Rouge.

In comparison even with the difficult case of Namibia, achieving this outcome under international supervision in Cambodian conditions is going to be immensely challenging. The harsh reality is that the Khmer Rouge is militarily dominant in the coalition and presumably understands the likelihood of its rejection in a free election, in which case it will prefer alternative routes.

In this kind of quandary, outside countries like Canada face very uncomfortable choices and responsibilities. With the principle of non-intervention now formally restored by the Vietnamese withdrawal, it is possible to acknowledge the Hun Sen government as a plausible (and demonstrably more humane) alternative to any Khmer Rouge dominated government. Canada could act to permit humanitarian aid in Cambodia through non-governmental organizations and take additional measures to recognize the changed status of the parties and counter the real dangers that the international community may have inadvertently enhanced the prospects of a Khmer Rouge return. External Affairs Minister Clark has charged Ambassador Allan Sullivan with a special mission to seek out options, and Canadians will applaud any substantial step away from the extremely distasteful possibilities that may have been strengthened by the formalistic United Nations decision in November.

Endnotes

1. *The Independent*, 21 November 1989, page 14.
2. See Appendix I for a list of wars and war-related deaths, 1945-1989. Reproduced with permission from *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989*, by Ruth Leger Sivard. Copyright © 1989 by World Priorities, Box 25140, Washington D.C. 20007, USA.
3. Driedger and Munton "The 1989 CIIPS Public Opinion Survey," December 1989, page 44.
4. These estimates, in constant 1985 dollars, are taken from the 1989 SIPRI Yearbook.
5. *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 December 1989, page 3.

APPENDIX I

Wars and War-related Deaths 1945–1989

Location and Identification of Conflict ¹	Number of Deaths:		
	Civilian	Military	Total
Latin America	448,000	211,000	668,000
<i>Argentina</i>			
1955–55 Armed Forces vs Peron	2,000	2,000	4,000
1976–79 "Disappearances"	12,000	3,000	15,000
1982–82 Arg. vs UK in Falklands	0	1,000	1,000
<i>Bolivia</i>			
1952–52 Revolution vs Government	1,000	1,000	2,000
<i>Brazil</i>			
1980–80 Rightist terrorism	1,000
<i>Chile</i>			
1973–73 Military coup: US intervening	5,000
1974–74 Executions by Government	20,000	0	20,000
1987–87 Mine strikers vs Army	3,000	0	3,000
<i>Colombia</i>			
1948–48 Conservatives vs Government	1,000
1949–62 Liberals vs Government	200,000	100,000	300,000
1986–88 Political killings; most drug-related	10,000	10,000	20,000
<i>Costa Rica</i>			
1946–48 Natl Un. vs Govt; US intervening	1,000	1,000	2,000
<i>Cuba</i>			
1958–59 Castro vs Batista; US intervening	2,000	3,000	5,000
<i>Dominican Republic</i>			
1965–65 US intervenes in civil war	1,000	2,000	3,000
<i>El Salvador</i>			
1979–89 Dem. Sal. Front vs Govt	47,000	18,000	65,000
<i>Guatemala</i>			
1954–54 Conservatives vs Govt; US interv.	1,000
1966–89 Govt. mass. Indians; US interv.	100,000	38,000	138,000
<i>Honduras</i>			
1969–69 El Sal. vs Hond. (Soccer War)	3,000	2,000	5,000
<i>Jamaica</i>			
1980–80 Election violence	1,000	0	1,000
<i>Nicaragua</i>			
1978–79 Sandinistas vs Somoza	25,000	10,000	35,000
1981–88 Contras vs Sandinistas	10,000	15,000	25,000
<i>Paraguay</i>			
1947–47 Liberals vs Government	1,000
<i>Peru</i>			
1983–89 Shining Path vs Govt	10,000	5,000	15,000
Europe	...	11,000	176,000
<i>Greece</i>			
1945–49 UK intervenes in civil war	160,000
<i>Hungary</i>			
1956–56 USSR intervenes in civil war	...	10,000	10,000
<i>Turkey</i>			
1977–80 Terrorism; mil. coup 1980	5,000
<i>USSR</i>			
1969–69 China attacks USSR border	...	1,000	1,000
Middle East	474,000	1,038,000	1,613,000
<i>Cyprus</i>			
1974–74 Natl Guard; Turkey invasion	3,000	2,000	5,000

Location and Identification of Conflict	Number of Deaths:		
	Civilian	Military	Total
<i>Egypt</i>			
1956-58 Suez; Israel, France, UK invasion	1,000	3,000	4,000
1967-70 Six-Day War; border conflicts	50,000	25,000	75,000
<i>Iran</i>			
1978-89 Islam vs Shah, dissidents, Kurds	70,000	18,000	88,000
1980-88 Iraq vs Iran	100,000	900,000	1,000,000
<i>Iraq</i>			
1959-59 Shammar Tribe vs Govt.	1,000	1,000	2,000
1961-70 Kurds vs Govt; Iran intervening	100,000	5,000	105,000
1988-89 Kurd civilians killed by army	9,000	1,000	10,000
<i>Israel</i>			
1948-48 Arab League vs Israel	0	8,000	8,000
1973-73 Yom Kippur Was vs Egypt, Syria	0	16,000	16,000
<i>Jordan</i>			
1970-70 Palestinians & Syrians vs Govt	5,000	5,000	10,000
<i>Lebanon</i>			
1958-58 US intervenes in civil war	1,000	1,000	2,000
1975-76 Syria intervenes in civil war	75,000	25,000	100,000
1982-89 Israel vs PLO; Syria intervening	40,000	22,000	62,000
<i>Syria</i>			
1982-82 Govt massacre Conserv. Muslims	10,000	0	10,000
<i>Yemen, North</i>			
1948-48 Yahya family vs Government	2,000	2,000	4,000
1962-69 Egypt intervenes in civil war	101,000
<i>Yemen, South</i>			
1986-86 Civil War	7,000	4,000	11,000
South Asia	2,510,000	593,000	3,103,000
<i>Afghanistan</i>			
1978-89 USSR intervenes in civil war	670,000	55,000	725,000
<i>Bangladesh</i>			
1971-71 India interv; famine & massacre	1,000,000	500,000	1,500,000
<i>India</i>			
1946-48 Muslims vs Hindus; UK interv.	800,000	0	800,000
1947-49 Muslims, Pakistan vs Kashmir (In.)	1,000	2,000	3,000
1948-48 India vs Hyderabad	1,000	1,000	2,000
1962-62 China vs India at border	1,000	1,000	2,000
1965-65 Pakistan vs Kashmir, India interv.	13,000	7,000	20,000
1971-71 Pakistan vs India; border	...	11,000	11,000
1983-88 Ethnic & political violence	9,000	3,000	12,000
<i>Pakistan</i>			
1973-77 Baluchis vs Govt; Afgh interv.	6,000	3,000	9,000
<i>Sri Lanka</i>			
1971-71 Maoists vs Govt	5,000	5,000	10,000
1984-89 Tamils vs Govt; India interv.	4,000	5,000	9,000
Far East	5,974,000	3,448,000	10,645,000
<i>Burma</i>			
1948-51 Karens vs Govt; China interv.	8,000
1980-80 Communists vs Government	5,000
1985-88 Rebels vs Government	6,000	3,000	9,000
<i>Cambodia</i>			
1970-75 N. Vietnam & US interv. civil war	156,000
1975-78 Pol Pot famine & massacre	750,000	250,000	1,000,000
1978-78 Vietnam vs Cambodia	14,000	50,000	64,000
<i>China</i>			
1946-50 Comms vs Kuomintang; US interv.	1,000,000
1950-51 Govt executes Landlords	1,000,000	...	1,000,000
1967-68 Cultural Revolution	450,000	50,000	500,000
1983-84 Govt executions	5,000	0	5,000

Location and Identification of Conflict ¹	Number of Deaths:		
	Civilian	Military	Total
<i>Indonesia</i>			
1945–46 Independence from Neth, UK	4,000	1,000	5,000
1950–50 Moluccans vs Government	5,000
1953–53 Darul Islam vs Government	1,000
1956–60 Communists vs Government	30,000
1965–66 Abortive coup; UK intervening	500,000	0	500,000
1975–89 Annex E. Timor; fam & massacre	90,000	16,000	106,000
<i>Korea</i>			
1948–48 Army vs Government	0	1,000	1,000
1950–53 Korean War; CH, US intervening	1,500,000	1,500,000	3,000,000
<i>South Korea</i>			
1980–80 Army killed people	1,000	0	1,000
<i>Laos</i>			
1960–73 Pathet Lao vs Govt; US, NV	18,000	12,000	30,000
<i>Malaysia</i>			
1950–60 UK intervenes in civil war	13,000
<i>Philippines</i>			
1950–52 Huks vs Government	5,000	4,000	9,000
1972–89 Muslims vs Government; US interv.	20,000	15,000	35,000
1972–89 Communists vs Govt; US interv.	20,000	20,000	40,000
<i>Taiwan</i>			
1947–47 Taiwan vs China	0	1,000	1,000
1947–47 Civilian riots vs Govt.	20,000	0	20,000
1954–55 Civil strife	5,000
<i>Tibet</i>			
1950–51 China vs Tibet	2,000	0	2,000
1956–59 Tibetan revolt	60,000	40,000	100,000
<i>Vietnam</i>			
1945–54 Indep. vs France; Ch. US interv.	300,000	300,000	600,000
1960–65 US intervenes in civil war	200,000	100,000	300,000
1965–75 US & S Vietnam vs N. Vietnam	1,000,000	1,058,000	2,058,000
1979–79 China vs Vietnam	9,000	26,000	35,000
1987–87 China vs Vietnam (border)	0	1,000	1,000
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,818,000	1,490,000	5,490,000
<i>Angola</i>			
1961–75 Indep. vs Port; USSR, SAF interv.	30,000	25,000	55,000
1975–89 Civil war, Cuba interv.; SAF invad.	320,000	21,000	341,000
<i>Burundi</i>			
1972–72 Hutus vs Govt; massacres	100,000	10,000	110,000
1988–88 Tutsi massacre Hutu civilians	5,000	0	5,000
<i>Cameroon</i>			
1955–60 Independence vs France, UK	32,000
<i>Chad</i>			
1980–87 Reb vs Govt; Fr, Libya interv.	2,000	5,000	7,000
<i>Ethiopia</i>			
1974–89 Eritrean rev. famine; Cuba interv.	500,000	39,000	539,000
1976–83 Cuba interv.; Somalia invades	15,000	24,000	39,000
<i>Ghana</i>			
1981–81 Konkomba vs Nanumba	1,000
<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>			
1962–74 Independence from Portugal	5,000	10,000	15,000
<i>Kenya</i>			
1952–63 Independence from UK	3,000	12,000	15,000
<i>Madagascar</i>			
1947–48 Independence from France	10,000	5,000	15,000
<i>Mozambique</i>			
1965–75 Independence from Portugal	30,000
1981–89 Famine worsened by civil war	365,000	50,000	415,000

Location and Identification of Conflict ¹	Number of Deaths:		
	Civilian	Military	Total
<i>Nigeria</i>			
1967-70 Biafrans vs Govt; famine & mass.	1,000,000	1,000,000	2,000,000
1980-81 Fundamental Islam vs Govt	5,000
1984-84 Fundamental Islam vs Govt	1,000
<i>Rwanda</i>			
1956-65 Tutsis vs Govt; massacres	102,000	3,000	105,000
<i>Somalia</i>			
1988-88 Civil War in north	5,000	5,000	10,000
<i>Sudan</i>			
1963-72 Blacks vs Govt; massacres	250,000	250,000	500,000
1984-89 Blacks vs Islamic Law	500,000	6,000	506,000
<i>Uganda</i>			
1966-66 Buganda Tribe vs Govt	1,000	1,000	2,000
1971-78 Idi Amin massacres	300,000	0	300,000
1978-79 Tanzania vs Amin; Libya interv.	...	3,000	3,000
1981-87 Army vs people; massacres	300,000	8,000	308,000
<i>West Sahara</i>			
1975-87 Independence from Morocco	3,000	13,000	16,000
<i>Zaire</i>			
1960-65 Katanga secess; UK, Belg interv.	100,000
<i>Zambia</i>			
1964-64 Civil strife	1,000
<i>Zimbabwe</i>			
1972-79 Patriot Front vs Rhodesia	12,000
1983-83 Political violence	2,000	0	2,000
Other Africa²	95,000	19,000	114,000
<i>Algeria</i>			
1945-45 France intervenes in civil war	2,000	0	2,000
1954-62 France intervenes in civil war	82,000	18,000	100,000
1962-63 Rebel leaders vs Govt	1,000	1,000	2,000
<i>Morocco</i>			
1953-56 Indep. from France; Spain interv.	3,000	0	3,000
<i>South Africa</i>			
1985-87 Blacks killed by police	4,000	0	4,000
<i>Tunisia</i>			
1952-54 Independence from France	3,000	0	3,000
Total Deaths, 1945-1989	13,319,000³	6,810,000³	21,809,000

Wars – deaths averaging more than 1,000 per year.

Intervention – overt military action by foreign forces, at the invitation of the government.

Invasion – armed attack by foreign country, including air attack without land invasion.

... Not available

1. Location refers to country which was the principal battleground.

2. Egypt is shown under Middle East.

3. Incomplete; breakdown of civilian and military deaths not available in all cases.

William Eckhardt, Research Director of the Lentz Peace Research Laboratory, prepares the war data for this table. For war deaths by country and year, 1700-1987, see WMSE 87-88.

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The Director's Annual Statement is published near the beginning of each year to highlight issues and events of the past year, and to draw attention to important future issues. Opportunities for Canadian interests and action form the basis of the review and forecast.

The Statement is the work of the Director, and he alone is responsible for its contents. In the preparation of the report, he has relied heavily on the advice and support of the Institute staff to whom he offers his sincere thanks.

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PEACE IN OUR TIME? A CANADIAN AGENDA INTO THE 1990s

As a landmark year in modern history, 1989 will now surely rank with 1789, the year of the French revolution. It is deliberately provocative to ask if this is the beginning of "peace in our time", echoing the fateful tones of Neville Chamberlain's self-delusory appeasement. There are an amazing number of new opportunites for peace and international cooperation, all of which demand careful attention and sustained effort. If the changed international climate now permits much more effective influence for Canada, it also demands changes in the way we see and conduct ourselves in the world.

BERNARD WOOD

Bernard Wood is the Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, a position he has held since February 1989. Previously, he was the founding director of the North-South Institute, an independent centre for research and information on international development, established in 1976.

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